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I give a biological account of epistemic normativity. My account explains the sense in
which it is true that belief is subject to a standard of correctness, and reduces epistemic
norms to there being doxastic strategies which guide how best to meet that standard.
Additionally, I give an explanation of the mistakes we make in our epistemic
discourse, understood as either taking epistemic properties and norms to be sui
generis and irreducible, and/or as failing to recognise the reductive base of epistemic
normativity. This explanation will appeal to the claim that the beliefs which constitute
our epistemic discourse are false but adaptive, and are the outcome of a non-truth-
tracking process. The opponents of my position are philosophers who take epistemic
normativity not to be reducible in this way, and to involve sui generis properties and
norms governing belief. The aim of the paper is to show that epistemic normativity
can be explained by appeal to the biological functions of our mechanisms of belief-
production.
Keywords: epistemic normativity; epistemic norms; biological function; belief; truth;
correctness
1. Preliminaries
Some of those interested in the nature of morality have been moved by considerations of
strangeness, a conversation made most famous by Mackie (1977). Since then, some philo-
sophers (e.g. Mackie 1977; Ruse 1986, 1993; Joyce 2001) have given error accounts of our
moral discourse and the norms and properties such discourse cites. Mackie directed his
arguments towards moral properties and discourse, but thought that his conclusions gener-
alised to, for example, the aesthetic case. If that is right we should also take them to gen-
eralise to the epistemic case, since our epistemic discourse equally commits us to
metaphysically strange properties, “entities that are hard to square with a naturalistic
world-view” (Olson 2011, 88).
Mackie argued that “there do not exist entities or relations of a certain kind, objective
values or requirements” (1977, 17). This point has two prongs. First, objective values if
they existed would be strange entities, qualities, or relations. Consider the property of
being morally forbidden. A little reﬂection on this reveals that “too much is being asked
of the world – there is simply nothing that is forbidden in the speciﬁcally moral sense of
the word” (Joyce 2001, iv). Second, if we were aware of these strange entities, qualities,
or relations, the way in which we were aware of them would be via a correspondingly
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strange faculty, different from the way in which we are aware of everything else (Mackie
1977, 38).
Our epistemic discourse also commits us to objective requirement, insofar as we take
epistemic reasons to be categorical reasons. Note that I am not basing an argument on
Mackie’s and others’ positions here. Rather, I am pointing out that there are error-theoretic
accounts given of other discourses, and so perhaps we can give an error-theoretic account of
our epistemic discourse too, especially since our epistemic discourse has the features
Mackie identiﬁes as problematic in the moral case, namely, the postulation of strange prop-
erties and the notion of objective requirement.
For the purposes of this paper I assume a motivational account of belief according to
which it is necessary to belief that it plays some motivational role. I adopt the role offered
by Lucy O’Brien, namely that belief is an attitude that “by itself, and relative to a ﬁxed back-
ground of desires, disposes the subject to behave in ways that would promote the satisfaction
of his desires if its contents were true” (O’Brien 2005, 56). I take features of belief linking it to
truth to be contingent ones. What makes something a belief then, is not its being truth directed
(or any nearby claim), but whether or not it plays some motivational role. If the reader does
not ﬁnd the condition I have put on belief appealing, she should feel free to replace it with her
favourite motivational role of belief and input that as the background to my account. I have
argued elsewhere that building belief’s relationship to truth into the very nature of belief (as
advocated by teleological and normative accounts, for example), is problematic insofar as it
cannot do the explanatory work advocates claim for it (Sullivan-Bissett 2017). Additionally,
it has recently been argued that nor can such accounts (so-called, epistemic constitutivist
accounts) ground epistemic normativity (Coˆte´-Bouchard 2016). So I think it is worth
seeing how far we can get with an alternative account of belief’s nature in an explanation
of epistemic normativity. For those readers dissatisﬁed with the starting assumption of a
motivational account of belief, I invite them to place the paper on a conditional: if the motiva-
tional account of belief is right, then epistemic normativity could be explained as my view
proposes.
In ascribing biological functions to our mechanisms of belief-production, I will adopt a
historical account of biological according to which, very roughly, the function of some trait
is to do whatever ancestors of that trait did which got them selected.1 For it to be appropriate
to ascribe a biological function to our mechanisms of belief-production then, they need to
have been selected for. There are several reasons to think that this is the case, though space
constraints prevent outlining them here (interested readers should see Millikan 1993c, 49,
and discussion in Fales 1996). Of note though is that, given my view that beliefs are necess-
arily motivational devices, the very nature of belief means that adaptive pressures will be in
play. The formation of beliefs produces changes to the way a subject navigates within and
responds to its environment, and so the mechanisms which produce them will be sensitive
to adaptive pressures.
2. Truth is not the only end
It has been argued in many places that our mechanisms of belief-production have as their
biological proper function the production of true beliefs (for representative views, see Papi-
neau 1987; Millikan 1993a, 1993b, 1993c). Without dwelling on the reasons in favour of
this claim, note that beliefs which are true are more likely to dispose a creature to act in
ways which will satisfy its desires, be they for food, warmth, sex, and so on. The claim
that true beliefs are adaptive has been taken to be obvious by many philosophers, Quine
for example claimed that “creatures inveterately wrong in their inductions have a pathetic
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but praiseworthy tendency to die before reproducing their kind” (Quine 1985, 39). Of
course, true beliefs are not always adaptive (see, for example, Stich 1990; Stephens
2001), but such exceptions should not deter us from accepting the plausible claim that
they usually are (Cowie 2014, 4007; Street 2009, 235).
For the sake of exposition, let us understand this claim as one which says that the only
function of our belief-producing mechanisms is to produce true beliefs. In this section I
present some cases of usually false belief in which the mechanisms which produce them
are functioning as they should. I do this to warm the reader up to the idea of there being
a biological function proper to the mechanisms which produce our beliefs, which is
other than to track truth.
The existence of false beliefs does not present a problem for the claim that our mech-
anisms for belief-production have as their only biological function the production of true
beliefs. This is because claiming a function for a set of cognitive mechanisms says
nothing about how often (or even if) this function will be performed. As Ruth Millikan
puts the point:
a description of the biological functions of the cognitive systems will in no way resemble a
catalogue of psychological laws. It is certainly no psychological law, for example, that our
beliefs are true, though it is a (teleo)function of our belief-ﬁxing systems to ﬁx true beliefs.
(Millikan 1993a, 177)
Functions can fail to be performed, and something possesses a function because in certain
key moments, the performance of it contributed to the reproductive success of its bearers.
(Compare with the case of sperm: it is no objection to the claim that sperm have the
proper function of fertilising ova that they rarely perform this function – “[m]ost never
ﬁnd an ovum and have to call it quits” [Millikan 1984, 34].)
What constitutes a problem for the only claim are those cases of false belief which seem
to have been produced by mechanisms doing what they were supposed to do, that is, pro-
ducing adaptive beliefs, which are usually false. If there are cases in which our mechanisms
for belief-production are functioning properly (that is, doing what ancestral tokens of that
type were selected for doing) when they produce such beliefs, this falsiﬁes the claim that the
only function of these mechanisms is to produce true beliefs.
Candidate cases are those of beliefs produced via self-enhancement bias, partiality bias
(different doxastic treatment of one’s friends over strangers), and self-deception, to name just
a few.2 Cases like these show that the mechanisms responsible for belief-production are not
solely geared, in all cases, towards truth. Admittedly this is a little quick, but note that such
cases represent a large set of beliefs held by ordinary people, which exhibit biases which are
not truth-directed, and so suggest (if not clearly demonstrate) that we need to recognise
another function proper to our belief-producing mechanisms, one which can accommodate
these beliefs. I suggest that it is the function of producing beliefs which have the role of being
useful in self-organisation. By organising beliefs, I will mean those beliefs which facilitate
self-organisation, maintain self-esteem, avoid psychological damage, and so on. These
organising beliefs do not have their utility in virtue of approximating to truth, but rather
in their assisting the effective functioning of the believer.
Adopting Millikan’s notion of “Normal” (note the capitalisation), used to designate a
normative historical (not statistical) sense of normality: the various mechanisms which
give rise to organising beliefs do so in circumstances abNormal for the production of
true beliefs. I will label the production of true beliefs proper function one, and the pro-
duction of organising beliefs in the sense just speciﬁed proper function two.
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There are two worries with my picture here, which I will answer before moving on. The
ﬁrst is that I have taken cases of, for example, self-deceptive beliefs, to be produced by
mechanisms functioning to produce organising beliefs operating as they should, and not
by mechanisms functioning to produce true beliefs and missing their target. An alternative
account of the production of these beliefs might be that they are the outcome of a malfunc-
tion of the general capacity to produce true beliefs. Why prefer my model of their pro-
duction? Here I appeal to Ryan McKay and Daniel Dennett’s (2009) distinction between
two types of misbelief: those resulting from a malfunction of the mechanisms of belief-pro-
duction, and those resulting from the Normal functioning of those mechanisms. Misbeliefs
of the ﬁrst type are the result of mechanisms failing to perform the function of producing
true beliefs. Misbeliefs of the second type are the result of mechanisms of belief-production
functioning as they should. The worry then about my description of the production of
beliefs resulting from various doxastic biases is that they are actually instances of the
ﬁrst kind of misbelief, and not the second.
To diffuse this worry I note that there are good reasons to think that these beliefs are not
malfunctioning ones, and are rather the result of general evolved capacities: they have a
certain psychological role to play. For example, recent empirical work has shown that
“optimal mental health is associated with unrealistically positive self-appraisals and
beliefs” (see McKay and Dennett 2009, 505–508 for discussion). Such unrealistic
beliefs about oneself lead to engagement in adaptive behaviours (Taylor and Brown
1994). Although McKay and Dennett’s focus is on positive illusions as Normally produced
beliefs (and not cases of malfunction), I think the other candidates I identiﬁed for organising
beliefs introduced above (and indeed, below) can be given a similar story. The existence of
these beliefs then is not in virtue of mistake, but of design.
The second worry is related to the way I have carved up the proper functions of our
mechanisms for belief-production; perhaps neither of my proposed function ascriptions
are correct. It is not that there are two functions: the production of true beliefs, and the pro-
duction of organising beliefs, there is rather just one function: the production of useful
beliefs. However, to capitulate to this worry would only be to re-describe the machinery
I am suggesting is in place. We could move to usefulness to capture what our mechanisms
for belief-production are up to, but only insofar as we can move to usefulness to capture
what all traits with biological functions are up to. We ascribe to the chameleon’s mechan-
isms of skin pigmentation the function of producing a camouﬂaging skin pattern, this is
useful insofar as it prevents predation. At a more coarse-grained level of description, the
function of these mechanisms is to produce useful skin patterns. This point is a trivial
one. My description of two proper functions as belonging to our mechanisms of belief-pro-
duction is supposed to map onto two sets of Normal conditions involved in the production
of beliefs: Normal conditions for the production of beliefs which are true, and Normal con-
ditions for the production of beliefs which are organising. Of course both of these functions
produce useful items, but usefulness will be part of the story for all functional items. That is
just bound up in the nature of function ascription.
A more sophisticated version of this worry might be the following: if we grant that
belief is the kind of thing which plays some motivational role parsed in terms of satisfying
desires when its contents are true, then why not identify the biological function of our mech-
anisms of belief-production as producing items which are suited to play this role in such a
way as to satisfy desires? This would capture those contexts in which they do so by produ-
cing items with true contents, and those contexts in which they do so by producing items
with organising contents.3 In response to this, I note that I have no objection to putting
things in these terms. If the biological function of our mechanisms of belief-production
Biological Function and Epistemic Normativity S97
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were to produce devices well suited to lead to desire satisfaction, we would still need to
specify two sets of Normal conditions for the performance of that function: those conditions
in which beliefs lead to desire satisfaction by being true, and those conditions in which they
do so by being organising. To repeat: talk in terms of different functions is intended to map
onto these different sets of Normal conditions. Moving to the claim that the function of our
mechanisms of belief-production is to produce devices which lead to desire satisfaction will
still require distinguishing these contexts.
I have given some examples of beliefs which are usually false, but which are neverthe-
less produced by mechanisms of belief-production functioning as they should. This will be
important later in my explanation of the intuitive pull of explanations which cite sui generis
epistemic properties and norms or which at the very least fail to note the reductive base of
epistemic normativity.
3. Epistemic normativity
I will give an explanation of epistemic normativity by appeal both to proper function one and
proper function two. Insofar as I appeal to proper function two, an outcome of my account is
that at least some of our beliefs about epistemic normativity are false but organising. I will use
the term epistemic normativity to pick out the conjunction of two claims. First, belief has a
standard of correctness according to which true beliefs are correct and false beliefs are incor-
rect.4 Second, there are sui generis epistemic norms which govern belief.
Looking ﬁrst to belief’s standard of correctness, truth and falsehood are a “dimension of
assessment of beliefs as opposed to many other psychological states or dispositions” (Wil-
liams 1973, 136). Though my imaginings or supposings will have contents which are true
or false, they are nevertheless not appropriately judged as correct or incorrect. Correctness
conditions then follow not only from the propositional content of a state, but also from the
state itself.
The standard of correctness for belief is that a belief is correct if and only if it is true.
“Correct” is not synonymous with “true,” but is thought to be a normative notion which
attaches not to the proposition believed, but to the attitude or act of believing. Following
Krister Bykvist and Anandi Hattiangadi, I will understand belief’s standard of correctness
as non-normative, understanding correctness in this way is in line with common usage:
Judging that w-ing is correct is compatible with judging that one ought not to w. Judging that w-
ing is incorrect is compatible with judging that one ought to w. When it is a fact that w-ing
meets a certain standard, there is always a further question whether the standard ought to be
met. In some cases, the standard ought to be met, in others, not. (Bykvist and Hattiangadi
2013, 103)
The point here is a simple one: some standards generate an ought, some standards do not,
and this depends on which other conditions obtain. For example, judging that “driving as a
woman in Saudi Arabia contravenes conventional standards is not to think a woman in
Saudi Arabia ought not to drive” (Bykvist and Hattiangadi 2013, 103). Here we have a stan-
dard which many people would not endorse, and so it is perhaps easier to see the difference
between a standard being in place and there being something normative about that standard.
In other cases, the difference may be obscured by our already endorsing the standard.
I appeal to Bykvist and Hattiangadi here in a pre-emptive spirit. Those who think stan-
dards of correctness necessarily entail there being something normative about that standard,
will already take my account as developed below to be wrongheaded, since it is in this
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weaker sense of standard that I will give an explanation of the standard of correctness for
belief. It is important then to be clear that there is a difference between a standard being in
place and there being something normative about that standard which generates an ought. I
will later explain why people are prone to think that there is a sui generis normativity
attached to the standard of belief, or at least, why people fail to recognise the biological
basis of this standard. I will also suggest that the standard of correctness for belief is not
always truth (see Sections 4.3 and 4.4).
Turning to epistemic norms which are claimed to govern belief formation. The most
obvious and discussed of such norms is grounded in belief’s standard of correctness:
Pascal Engel claims that it “is generally agreed that the normative dimension in belief is
its dimension of correctness, and that the norm for belief, if there is such a norm, is that
a belief is correct if and only if it is true” (Engel 2007, 180).
Other kinds of norms include those of evidence (a belief is correct if it rests upon sufﬁ-
cient evidence), knowledge (a belief is correct if and only if it aims at knowledge), and
rationality (a belief is correct if and only if it is rational) (Engel 2007, 181). These norms
are taken to govern only belief – it is generally inappropriate to say of my imaginings or
supposings that they are rational, irrational, justiﬁed, unjustiﬁed, and so on (and where it
is not inappropriate, such judgements are grounded on the downstream effects of the atti-
tude). These epistemic norms have been understood as categorical ones, that is, as ones
where our obligations to comply with them are those “to which the practical beneﬁts of
beliefs are not relevant. They are obligations that arise from a purely impartial and disinter-
ested perspective” (Feldman 1988, 236).
What I take to require an explanation then are the following two claims.
(EN1) Beliefs have truth as their standard of correctness.
(EN2) There are sui generis categorical epistemic norms.
The explanatory burden is to give an account of why (EN1) and (EN2) hold or at least, why
we think that they do (when they do not). My account will pave a middle way. I will argue
that there is a sense in which (EN1) and (EN2) are true, but not in the way that they are
typically taken to be. My explanation will go via the claim that our mechanisms of
belief-production have the function of producing true beliefs, and this is the only sense
in which true beliefs are correct and false beliefs are incorrect (EN1). Given belief’s stan-
dard of correctness, there are strategies for doxastic regulation which facilitate the for-
mation of beliefs in line with this standard. So there are not sui generis norms governing
belief as (EN2) states, but rather these norms are reducible to doxastic strategies which
facilitate the meeting of belief’s standard of correctness.
4. Reducible and irreducible epistemic normativity
There are at least two ways to understand claims (EN1) and (EN2), relating to how we
understand the normativity involved. The opponent to my view is she who takes claims
(EN1) and (EN2) at face value, as involving sui generis irreducible epistemic normativity,
or weaker, as not being reducible to biological function. There are two kinds of explanation
important to my discussion: one which cites sui generis epistemic normativity or is silent
with respect to the reductive base of epistemic normativity, and my preferred explanation
which is a biological reductionist explanation. I am going to refer to the positions which
give these two explanations as irreducible epistemic normativity, and reducible epistemic
normativity.
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The way in which I think that (EN1) and (EN2) are true then, is the way which I have
called reducible epistemic normativity, and this can be explained by appeal to proper func-
tion one. However, many of us ﬁnd it intuitive5 that (EN1) and (EN2) are to be understood
more in line with what I have called irreducible epistemic normativity. So as well as giving
an account of why reducible epistemic normativity is true, I will also give an explanation of
why we make the mistake of thinking that irreducible epistemic normativity is true. This
mistake can be explained by appeal to proper function two.6
4.1. Explaining reducible epistemic normativity
Before giving my explanation of reducible epistemic normativity, a digression is needed to
note my use of “categorical” in this paper, which is important for being clear about the com-
mitments of my view. I said earlier in my explication of epistemic normativity that episte-
mic norms have been taken to be categorical, and I cashed out what this means in terms of
independence from agents’ goals or desires. However, a little more is needed, since cate-
goricity has been understood along at least two dimensions. Often these two dimensions
are treated as equivalent, or at least, as not requiring separation, as we will see in explica-
tions from Kant and Chase B. Wrenn below. To see the various parts of my view, these
dimensions should be kept separate.
The ﬁrst dimension is independence from the goals or desires of agents which the rule or
norm binds. This is contrasted with hypothetical norms or rules as ones which are binding
only insofar as they are means to some other end. Kant explicates categoricity in this way,
noting that “[t]he categorical imperative would be that which represented an action as
necessary of itself without reference to another end, that is, as objectively necessary”
(Kant 1785/2005, [414]/74). A categorical imperative “would express a reason for acting
which was unconditional in the sense of not being contingent upon any present desire of
the agent to whose satisfaction the recommended action would contribute as a means”
(Mackie 1977, 29).
Another dimension of categoricity though, is its binding all rational agents. Again, Kant
speaks of categorical imperatives governing all subjects who are “practically determinable
by reason” (Kant 1785/2005, [414]/74). And Wrenn claims that a categorical rule is one
which “binds everyone, regardless of their particular ends” (Wrenn 2004, 279, my
emphasis).
Often these two dimensions are kept together (as in the previous quote fromWrenn) – a
rule or norm which is categorical in the sense of applying to agents independently of their
aims or desires, is also one which is categorical in the sense of applying to all agents of a
given type, say, all rational agents. My view is one which understands so-called epistemic
norms as doxastic strategies which facilitate the meeting of belief’s standard of correctness.
These strategies do not represent categorical imperatives in either sense. Though they might
be good strategies regardless of the interests of agents (“believe in line with perceptual
experience” is a strategy which will facilitate believing in line with belief’s standard of cor-
rectness, even if I have no desire to have true beliefs), they do not generate any claims about
how the agent ought to believe, and so following them is not “objectively necessary.” These
strategies are also not categorical in the sense of applying to all rational agents, or all believ-
ers, and that is because not all beliefs will have truth as their standard of correctness (see
Sections 4.3 and 4.4).
I now move to explaining (EN1) and (EN2). My explanation of (EN1) is the following:
our belief-producing mechanisms have as one of their proper functions the production of
true beliefs, and this provides the only sense in which true beliefs are correct and false
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beliefs are incorrect. This is in the same way that there is a standard from which a chame-
leon’s skin pattern can deviate determined by the environment which makes it a correct or
incorrect skin pattern. In the case of belief, their contents can vary with respect to their
meeting the correctness conditions laid down by biology. When a belief is true, the mech-
anisms which produced it have performed their function, when a belief is false the mech-
anisms have failed to perform their function (or stronger, have malfunctioned). It is in this
sense only that beliefs have a standard of correctness.
Beliefs produced by mechanisms functioning to produce true beliefs have the derived
proper function of being true. What does that say about what the individual believer
must do? Absolutely nothing. As Papineau notes, it “is a vulgar, and indeed dangerous,
error to infer, from the premise that X has been biologically designed to do y, that in
some sense X ought to y” (Papineau 1999, 21, fn. 5). Our mechanisms of belief-production
being designed to produce true beliefs does not mean that they ought to, nor does it mean
that we, at the agent-level, ought to facilitate the meeting of this standard. This is important,
because our epistemic practice suggests that we do feel obligations in this area, and yet, if
the standard of correctness for belief is grounded in something which does not generate
obligations, what are we to say of our epistemic practice? The idea I will develop is the fol-
lowing one: our epistemic practice is not tracking any real obligation on us to believe truly,
rather, the derived biological function of many of our beliefs is to be true, and our epistemic
practice facilitates the meeting of that biologically grounded standard.
My explanation of (EN2) ismore a denial of the phenomenon so characterised. Epistemic
norms are reducible to doxastic strategies which facilitate the meeting of belief’s standard of
correctness. These strategies are mischaracterised as categorical epistemic norms which bind
our doxastic practice. The kinds of strategies I have in mind are those like “treat normal per-
ceptual experience as prima facie veridical, honor logical inferences, and employ the induc-
tive methods in empirical enquiry” (Leiter 2015, 75). These are strategies which “facilitate
successful navigation of the world and prediction of the future course of experience”
(Leiter 2015, 75).Why dowe take these strategies to bemore heavy-duty, and to involve nor-
mative force? At least part of the answer is that creatures who tend towards judging that con-
siderations of truth represent normative reasons for belief will be more likely to arrive at true
beliefs about their environment, which, as I suggested earlier, is adaptive (Street 2009, 234).
Similar things can be said about regulating one’s belief formation by considerations regard-
ing what would be a justiﬁed belief, or a rational belief, and so on.
One way of thinking about my view is to note the ways in which I depart from my
opponents. I disagree with the proponent of irreducible epistemic normativity on three
grounds: I disagree that there are irreducible epistemic norms, I disagree with the global
extension of those norms (I do not think all believers are governed by such norms), and
I disagree with local extension of norms governing belief (I do not think all of our
beliefs are governed by such norms). I will take each point in turn.
4.2. Irreducibility
On my view there are no irreducible epistemic properties or norms. My explanation of
(EN1) is one which appeals to proper function one of our mechanisms for belief-production.
This proper function provides the sense in which truth is the standard of correctness for
beliefs. My explanation of (EN2) goes via an appeal to this biological standard, and
notes that there are doxastic strategies which facilitate meeting it. Epistemic norms then
are reducible to strategies one can adopt which make it more likely that one will have
true beliefs, beliefs produced by mechanisms which are successful in performing proper
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function one. My opponent takes belief’s standard of correctness to be epistemic in kind,
and takes there to be categorical epistemic norms which bind our doxastic practice.
4.3. Global extension
My view is that (EN1) and (EN2) do not hold for all believers. I take the standard of cor-
rectness for belief and the doxastic strategies which facilitate meeting it, to be a result of the
biological history of our mechanisms of belief-production, and so this standard and the
strategies which facilitate its being met do not hold for all believers. I do not think, for
example, that it is already determined that Swampman’s beliefs are correct when true,
and if that is right, strategies like “believe in line with perceptual experience” are not
going to be ones which facilitate meeting the standard of correctness for Swampman’s
beliefs (if they have one). This is because Swampman does not have a biological
history.7 For a rational creature with a different (biological) history, my opponent will
take belief’s standard of correctness and epistemic norms to apply to them. For my
account, whether this creature’s beliefs are correct when true, and so whether certain dox-
astic strategies will facilitate meeting that standard, is an empirical question, in particular,
one which may turn on that creature’s biology or other relevant historical factors.
4.4. Local extension
Third, and most controversially, I disagree with my opponent about the local extension of
(EN1) and (EN2). I am seeking to explain (EN1) and (EN2) for the large subset of our
beliefs which are produced by mechanisms performing (or trying to perform) proper func-
tion one: the production of true beliefs. But, as I argued earlier, it would be remiss of us not
to note that many of our beliefs are produced by mechanisms seeking to produce organising
beliefs, whose usefulness is not in their approximating to truth, but in facilitating the self-
organisation of the believer. Those beliefs which are produced by mechanisms of belief-
production functioning to produce organising beliefs, do not come under the standard of
truth for belief. This means that some false beliefs are correct (insofar as they are the
result of mechanisms functioning properly in line with proper function two), and some
false beliefs are incorrect (insofar as they are the result of mechanisms functioning impro-
perly in line with proper function one). This is a consequence of locating the correctness of
belief in the proper functions of the mechanisms which produce them. This means that, not
only do (EN1) and (EN2) not apply to all believers, they also do not apply to all of the
beliefs of humans.
5. Explaining (away) irreducible epistemic normativity
In the previous section I gave my explanation of the sense in which (EN1) and (EN2) are
true, and noted how my view departs from proponents of irreducible epistemic normativity.
However, this is an explanation which, I suspect, will strike many as unintuitive. If you
already agree that epistemic normativity (as identiﬁed as constituted by (EN1) and
(EN2)) can be given a biological explanation, and you have no intuitions in contrast
with that, and already take the epistemic discourse you engage in to involve systematic
error, I have completed my journey with you. I suspect though that most readers will not
be persuaded by explanatory power alone. As both Mackie and Richard Joyce note in
their discussion of the moral case, in claiming that some discourse commits us to systematic
error, one ought to be able to give an account of why we commit these mistakes (Mackie
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1977, 17–18; Joyce 2001, 135). As such, it falls upon me now to give consideration to how
we think about the claims in (EN1) and (EN2), identify the mistakes we make in our epis-
temic discourse, and explain why we do so.8
5.1. Identifying the error(s)
The account one offers of the mistakes we make in our epistemic discourse will vary,
depending on exactly what the mistakes are. I think there are two options. The ﬁrst is to
understand our epistemic discourse as one which posits sui generis irreducible epistemic
properties and norms, the existence of which my account denies. The second is to under-
stand our epistemic discourse as one which is incomplete in its failing to recognise the
reductive base of epistemic normativity. This would be to understand epistemic discourse
merely as one which does not present as tracking some biological standard, but nor does it
commit us to sui generis irreducible epistemic normativity. I will offer an account which
can explain why we make either or both of these mistakes.
Does our epistemic discourse involve the positing of sui generis irreducible epistemic
properties and norms, and beliefs in line with this? When we say things like “it is correct to
believe that that Neil Armstrong walked on the moon because it is true that Neil Armstrong
walked on the moon,” do we take ourselves to be appealing to a special kind of normativity?
Put in this way, perhaps not. However, those philosophers engaged in conceptual analysis
of belief, who take belief to be subject to an epistemic standard which is not merely a bio-
logical one, might support this characterisation of our epistemic discourse. If their analysis
of the concept of belief is right, then this will map onto common practice. Consider also
those who take the practice of inquiry very seriously, people who are so driven to ﬁnd
truths – such people might be correctly characterised as feeling strong epistemic obli-
gations, in line with the characterisation of epistemic discourse involving appeal to sui
generis irreducible norms and properties.9
Perhaps our epistemic discourse does not involve anything so sophisticated, but rather,
just fails to reﬂect the truth about the reductive base of epistemic normativity. So when we
say things like “it is correct to believe that Neil Armstrong walked on the moon because it is
true that Neil Armstrong walked on the moon,” we are not citing sui generis epistemic prop-
erties or norms, we are just failing to recognise the only sense in which it is true that believ-
ing this would be correct – that doing so would be to believe in line with belief’s
biologically grounded standard of correctness.
Note that if this is the right characterisation of the error inherent in epistemic discourse,
it is not just that we are ignorant of the reductive base. We also make the mistake of thinking
that belief’s standard of correctness (however it is grounded), generates claims about how
we ought to believe. And, as I noted earlier, that is an error. Our mechanisms of belief-pro-
duction having the biological function of producing true beliefs entails nothing about how
we ought to form beliefs. So even if our epistemic discourse does not commit us to sui
generis epistemic properties, at the very least it commits us to ought-claims about what
to believe, or to thinking that we have reasons to believe truly, regardless of our interests.
On my view, those claims are false.
Ought-claims alone are not kryptonite to the naturalist, since naturalists can perfectly
well accommodate hypothetical oughts. But our epistemic discourse does not commit us
to these harmless imperatives. We think that we can have epistemic reasons to believe prop-
ositions even if “one’s believing those propositions holds no promise of advancing any goal
which one actually possesses” (Kelly 2003, 630). We think that we can have epistemic
reasons to believe propositions which are “not contingent upon whether [we] care about
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believing what is true” (Cuneo 2007, 59). Even if our mistake with respect to the nature of
epistemic normativity is in our not recognising its reductive (biological) base, we also make
judgements about having reasons to believe which are not hypothetical in kind.10
We need not resolve exactly what we commit ourselves to in our epistemic discourse,
since what I will say below, with appropriate amendments, can explain either of these
characterisations. In laying them out though, I have sought to capture whatever it is such
discourse involves, and what they have in common, namely, that they take the standard
of correctness for belief to be normative, and they take there to be categorical epistemic
norms. So though it is up for grabs where the error lies, at the very least, when we make
judgements about epistemic reasons, “we have a strong sense that we are tracking facts
that are robustly independent of us” (Street 2009, 243). I agree with Sharon Street that
we are right to think this, but I depart from the irreducible epistemic normativity theorist,
and indeed from Street, with respect to the way in which it is right. What matters for the
moment though is that whatever we are tracking is not normative, and is rather reducible
to biological function.
Some readers at this point may be on board, and may see the explanatory burden our
epistemic discourse places on a biological reductionist account. Others might accuse me
of over-intellectualising our discourse, and might say that there is no such burden. If
these others are right, I have no argument with them.11 However, here I answer those
who think that in giving a biological reductionist account of epistemic normativity I
leave something unexplained.
5.2. Explaining the error(s)
We have seen two ways in which our epistemic discourse might be in error: by positing sui
generis epistemic normativity, and/or by failing to acknowledge the biological nature of
epistemic normativity. Both errors mistakenly take belief’s standard of correctness and
the strategies which might facilitate our meeting it, to be prescriptive and categorical.
My strategy is to give a biological error-theoretic explanation of why we make these
mistakes, by appeal to the claim that doing so is adaptive. I am interested in explaining
why we have those beliefs which are part of our epistemic discourse, even though they
are false.12 For the purpose of exposition, call these irreducible epistemic beliefs (a little
less cumbersome than “beliefs about irreducible epistemic normativity”). In short, my
claim is that having true beliefs is adaptive, and believing in irreducible epistemic norma-
tivity facilitates the production of true beliefs. Given this, we should expect that believers
would be equipped with domain-speciﬁc-regulating mechanisms speciﬁcally tailored to
produce these irreducible epistemic beliefs.
Wherever we identify the error in epistemic discourse, many of our beliefs thereof are
false. Those beliefs about sui generis irreducible epistemic properties and norms express
propositions which are uniformly false. Those beliefs which fail to reﬂect the source of epis-
temic normativity as biological normativity are, at the very least, incomplete. An expla-
nation can be given for why we have such beliefs by appeal to the biological usefulness
of them. Our having irreducible epistemic beliefs helps facilitate the meeting of belief’s bio-
logically grounded standard of correctness. In offering an evolutionary explanation which
cites a process as non-truth-tracking, I am not saying that the contents of the target beliefs
can be explained in evolutionary terms – that particular beliefs were selected. Rather, I am
accounting for our tendency to have such beliefs by claiming that what has been selected for
are “cognitive mechanisms that entail dispositions to form certain primitive belief-like rep-
resentations in certain environments” (Clarke-Doane 2012, 318).
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It is in the following way that irreducible epistemic beliefs could be biologically useful,
and it is because of their usefulness, that the mechanisms which produce them may have
proliferated. Recall, such mechanisms function to produce organising beliefs, which are
useful not as an approximation to truth, but rather useful with respect to facilitating the
effective self-organisation of the believer. In order to make our mechanisms of belief-pro-
duction more likely to perform their proper function of producing true beliefs, our biologi-
cal history has ensured we have thoughts about correct, incorrect, rational, irrational,
justiﬁed, unjustiﬁed (and so on) belief, where we take such evaluations to involve sui
generis normativity, or at the very least, we do not take them to be reducible to biology.
We hold our beliefs up to epistemic standards; we feel we ought to have sufﬁcient or
good evidence for our beliefs and that others ought to apply the same standards to their
beliefs. We have evolved dispositions which incline us to judge our beliefs and the
beliefs of others in these ways. We have an interest in the beliefs of other people: we use
them as information sources, and the success of their actions will often depend on their
beliefs being true or rational or justiﬁed (Wrenn 2004, 284–285). Our feeling it appropriate
to hold our beliefs to epistemic norms – to standards of production – is a way of making it
more likely that our beliefs have true contents.
Having true beliefs, that is, having beliefs which reﬂect the biological nature of episte-
mic normativity, would result in fewer true beliefs than we would have were we to have
false beliefs about epistemic normativity (as, I say, we do). If we recognised that the
only sense in which true belief is correct belief is the biological sense, we would be less
inclined to form beliefs in accordance with what we identify as epistemic norms, that is,
doxastic strategies which facilitate the meeting of belief’s biologically grounded standard
of correctness. Just as in Joyce’s parallel account of moral beliefs, these “feelings of ‘ines-
capable requirement’ will, in certain circumstances, serve reproductive ﬁtness more effec-
tively” (Joyce 2001, 140) than true beliefs about the nature of epistemic normativity.
This account assumes that we can exercise some kind of control over our beliefs. This is
a harmless assumption, since it is one we ﬁnd in our very practice of epistemic evaluation.
As Kate Nolﬁ notes, though epistemic evaluation does function to mark whether a believer
meets some epistemic standard, it also is “evaluation that has directive or instructive
import” (Nolﬁ 2014, 99, fn. 1). The appropriateness of epistemic evaluation is explained
in part by our being able to exercise some kind of doxastic control – and our epistemic eva-
luative practices presuppose this (Nolﬁ 2014, 109, fn. 19).13 Now then, I move on to show
how our falsely judging that epistemic normativity involves sui generis properties or norms,
or our simply not representing epistemic normativity as reducible to biology, is adaptive.
Compare the case of belief-forming practices to our reproductive practices. The func-
tion of our reproductive organs is to reproduce. We recognise this and yet many of us
choose not to reproduce. We do not allow the standards laid down by biology to motivate
us inescapably to act in accordance with them. Though we do not take there to be sui
generis irreducible categorical procreation norms, there is a mechanism in place which
helps facilitate our following that biological imperative (i.e. sexual desire; and/or so-
called broodiness). We might expect to ﬁnd some mechanism in the epistemic case
present to encourage us to follow the standards for belief laid down by biology. I think
our epistemic discourse is just such a mechanism.
Biology has laid down truth as the standard of correctness for belief, that is, we Normally
believe truly (in circumstances Normal for the performance of proper function one). There
are doxastic practices which facilitate our beliefs meeting that standard. Recognising that
there are standards laid down by biology with respect to our belief-forming practices,
does not in any way secure conforming to those standards. If we had true beliefs about the
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nature of epistemic normativity, we may well be less motivated to form beliefs in epistemi-
cally ideal ways, so far as this is psychologically possible, and also might be less disposed to
judge the epistemic behaviour of others. Our having beliefs which reﬂect the true nature of
epistemic normativity only guarantees that we recognise in a weak sense, that belief has a
standard of correctness and there are ways to go about meeting that standard. What is not
guaranteed by the presence of these features is that one believes that p on sufﬁcient or reason-
able evidence, or that we feel motivated to respond to putative epistemic norms.
Knowing that the standards and norms for some activity are only biological in kind
might allow for reﬂective distance; one might feel less motivated to adhere to some stan-
dard, if that standard is merely a biological one.14 Having beliefs at the wrong strength
with respect to the normativity involved in belief might make it psychologically more dif-
ﬁcult not to engage in the kinds of behaviours and belief-forming practices that our episte-
mic discourse commits us to. That is, such discourse encourages us to exercise doxastic
control in line with what we take to be epistemic standards and norms.
In addition, my explanation of reducible epistemic normativity speaks against the
truth of a stronger reading of (EN1) and (EN2) (which has irreducible epistemic
beliefs coming out as true). Note that the claims of reducible epistemic normativity
and irreducible epistemic normativity are contraries. To see this, let us see how far we
can get when we imagine their both being true. Consider the opposing explanations of
(EN1): belief’s standard of correctness would be reducible to biology, but also be part
of the very concept of belief. This would introduce overdetermination, which is presum-
ably best avoided. Now the explanations of EN2: on my view epistemic norms are redu-
cible to doxastic strategies which we identify as sui generis norms guiding our epistemic
practice. My opponent though takes there to be these sui generis norms which are not
reducible as I claim, and given these contradictory claims, we cannot both be right.
The falsity of irreducible epistemic normativity follows from the truth of my account
of reducible epistemic normativity. And then all that remains is to explain why we never-
theless are under the illusion of irreducible epistemic normativity, which has been the
focus of this section.
A more ambitious claim, for which I have not argued, is that epistemic normativity can
only be explained by appeal to biology. One way to support that claim would be to argue
that our irreducible epistemic beliefs are not a good guide for theorising about the nature of
epistemic normativity (given their proposed etiology), and so do not provide us with evi-
dence against the biological account given here, and then, perhaps, we have no reason to
believe that an explanation in irreducible terms is required. This is a more ambitious
project than showing that the biological account has the resources to accommodate the
explananda, and is something I do not undertake here.
6. A note on expressivism
One way to develop the account that I have been outlining, is to “go expressivist” about
what I have understood to be irreducible epistemic beliefs.15 So claims like “Glen’s
belief is irrational,” or “Katie has an epistemic reason to believe that p, even though she
does not care about forming a belief about p,” are not ones which give voice to some
belief the subject has, but rather are merely expressions of some sentiment, commitment,
or other non-cognitive mental state (Bar-On and Sias 2013, 699).
There are two reasons one might be attracted to such a position, given what I have said
in the paper. First, considerations of metaphysical strangeness abound when we think about
the commitments we make in having attitudes about irreducible epistemic normativity.
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Rejecting the claim that such attitudes are in the business of reporting some state of the
world makes that strangeness disappear (Bar-On and Sias 2013, 701). Second, expressivist
proposals in general have been motivated, at least in part, by their ability “to capture an
apparent connection between sincere utterances of claims in that discourse and non-neu-
trality on the part of the speaker in terms of attitude and motivation” (Bar-On and Sias
2013, 700). We have seen that something like this connection is in play with the target
phenomenon here – utterances in epistemic discourse serve the purpose of regulating the
belief-forming practices of oneself and others. Adopting expressivism about irreducible
epistemic attitudes might capture this feature of them.
For those attracted to such a view, I note that adopting it in the context of what has been
argued in this paper would only call for some fairly minor adjustments to the overall
account, after all, my proposal as it stands and expressivism about the target phenomenon
are in agreement on ontological matters. The adjustment would be that instead of giving an
account of why we are disposed to have certain beliefs (even though they are false), the
evolutionary explanation would take as its target our having certain sentiments, or commit-
ments. A fuller discussion of this way of developing the account is beyond the scope of the
current paper, I just note then that such a development is a possible one.
7. Conclusions
I gave a biological account of epistemic normativity, which explained the sense in which it
is true that belief is subject to a standard of correctness, and reduced sui generis epistemic
norms to doxastic strategies prescribed by our epistemic discourse which facilitate the
meeting of belief’s biologically grounded standard. I also gave an explanation for why
we have beliefs in line with irreducible epistemic normativity, which went via the claim
that having such beliefs is adaptive. I conclude that a biological account of belief has the
resources to accommodate belief’s standard of correctness and the epistemic practices
which govern belief formation and maintenance.
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Notes
1. Versions of this so-called strong etiological account can be found in Millikan (1984, 1989),
Neander (1991a, 1991b), Papineau (1993), and Sullivan-Bissett (2016). Weaker etiological
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accounts which do not require selection of the functionally characterised trait but only that past
tokens of it contributed to organismic ﬁtness can be found in Buller (1998) and Price (1995,
2001). I think my account could house a weaker etiological theory of function, but for the pur-
poses of this paper, and because my view is that the strong etiological account is correct, I adopt
a stronger version.
2. Indeed, evolutionary accounts have already been given of at least some of these phenomena. For
example, the capacity to self-deceive has been explained as an evolutionary adaptation (Trivers
2000, 2011, 2013) and as an evolutionary spandrel (Van Leeuwen 2007, 2008).
3. I am grateful to an anonymous referee for this more sophisticated version of the worry.
4. Note that belief’s standard of correctness is not a demarcating feature of belief, as this standard
is shared by guesses (Owens 2003).
5. For those who do not have the intuition that (EN1) and (EN2) ought to be understood in these
terms, I do not have the burden or providing an error theory of that intuition.
6. I should note that the way I have mapped the terrain does not carve things along the line between
what Christopher Cowie calls intrinsicalists and instrumentalists about epistemic normativity.
According to the ﬁrst position, epistemic normativity is sui generis normativity, so for
example, we have reason to believe in line with the evidence because of some “brutely epistemic
normative truth” (Cowie 2014, 4003). Obviously, this is a view which my position opposes.
According to the second position, epistemic normativity is derivative of practical normativity,
so for example, we have reason to believe in line with the evidence because by doing so we are
more likely to fulﬁll our goals and satisfy our desires (Cowie 2014, 4003). It might be less
obvious how my view is different from this one. I take it this is the kind of position David Papi-
neau has in mind when he argues that there is no distinctive epistemic normativity, and that the
rightness or wrongness of believing truly or falsely is traceable to moral, personal, or aesthetic
normativity (Papineau 2013). My view is different from this, since I claim that the only sense in
which a true belief is correct is the sense in which the mechanisms which produced it have per-
formed their biological proper function. So though both myself and epistemic instrumentalists
are reductionists, the way in which we are so means that the positions should be kept separate.
7. The case of Swampman might not be an ideal one, since there is room for saying that Swamp-
man is not a rational agent, and thus the dimension of categoricity which is to do with appli-
cation to all rational agents will not apply here. If that is right, then take a rational alien
being. In my view, it is an open question whether (EN1) and (EN2) apply to the beliefs of
such a being.
8. There is a substantial literature on the coherence of error theories, which I cannot engage with
here. If it turns out that error theories cannot be true, the work here will, at the very least, require
serious adjustment. However, there are good reasons to think that general purpose arguments
against error theories in general have not yet gotten a hold, and that the prospects for error
theory may well have been underestimated (see, for example, Daly and Liggins 2010), and
so it is legitimate, I think, to offer a theory in these terms, at least for now.
9. Thanks to Keith Allen for discussion on this.
10. Even the instrumentalist about epistemic normativity recognises that she needs to tell a story
about the putative (but non-actual) categoricity of epistemic reasons (e.g. Olson 2011, 86; Papi-
neau 1999, 24).
11. Though see Joyce (2001, 141) for an argument that humans engage in talk of categorical
reasons, even if they do not use the correct philosophical jargon.
12. The work I am doing here is merely descriptive, I make no claims about what we ought to do as
believers. A sensible naturalised epistemology would look something like the one Papineau
develops according to which “you should think of yourself as a system for generating true
beliefs. You want to be as reliable such a system as possible. So you should consider ways
of redesigning the system, and should implement those that promise an improvement” (Papi-
neau 1987, 135).
13. I agree with most philosophers that we cannot exercise any direct control over our beliefs.
However, my account of the usefulness of irreducible epistemic beliefs does not require the
truth of doxastic voluntarism, it requires only that we can exercise doxastic control in some
sense. Whatever account one prefers of our ability to exercise doxastic control, this will be con-
genial to what I want to say about the usefulness of our false beliefs about epistemic normativity.
For example, the Immediate Causal Impact account has it that a believer exercises doxastic
control when she is caused to regulate her beliefs in some particular circumstances by her
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judgements regarding how she ought to regulate her beliefs in those particular circumstances
(Nolﬁ 2014, 97). The Disposition Regulation Account of doxastic control has it that a believer’s
judgements about how she ought to believe do not directly impact her practice, but rather shape
her cognitive character, thus having a deferred impact on her belief-forming practices, by bring-
ing “the way in which she believes closer in line with her conception of the relevant epistemic
ideal” (Nolﬁ 2014, 108). Whichever of these accounts is correct, we can see how judgements of
epistemic evaluation can impact the regulation of our beliefs. This occurs either directly via
those judgements (Immediate Causal Impact account), or indirectly via those judgements
shaping our cognitive characters (Disposition Regulation Account).
14. Of course, if I persuade the reader that epistemic normativity can be given a biological expla-
nation, and engender in her a reﬂective distance from the behaviours and beliefs our epistemic
discourse prescribes, she may as a result form fewer true beliefs. Though she will have the con-
solation of having true beliefs about the nature of epistemic normativity.
15. Thanks to Paul Noordhof and Carolyn Price for bringing this way of developing the account to
my attention.
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